Strategic unionism in Eastern Europe: the case of Romania by Trif, Aurora & Koch, Karl
www.ssoar.info
Strategic unionism in Eastern Europe: the case of
Romania
Trif, Aurora; Koch, Karl
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Trif, A., & Koch, K. (2005). Strategic unionism in Eastern Europe: the case of Romania. (MPIfG Working Paper, 7).
Köln: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41677
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
MPIfG Working Paper 05/7, July 2005
 
Strategic Unionism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania
 
Aurora Trif  and Karl Koch, London South Bank University
 
This paper is a modified and updated version of a chapter published by the authors in Huzzard/Gregory
/Scott's (2004) book. An earlier version of the paper was presented to the IIRA 7th European Congress
'The Future of Work in Europe' held in Lisbon in 2004. The authors are grateful to the participants of the
IIRA Congress for the discussions, and to Marco Hauptmeier, Tony Huzzard and Luana Pop for their
useful comments.
 
 
 
Abstract
 
The shift from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economic models presented trade unions in
Eastern European countries with crucial choices in relation to their roles as industrial relations actors. This
paper investigates whether (and why) unions have chosen adversarial and/or co-operative relationships
with the employers, based on a strategic choice conceptual framework. It focuses on trade union relations
with employers at national, sectoral and company levels in Romania. It is argued that adversarial and
co-operative relations between unions and employers developed simultaneously after 1989, but
co-operation was the prevalent approach. Evidence suggests that ideological legacies, former institutions
and the initial decision to participate in the macroeconomic transformation played a key role in shaping
unions' choices towards co-operation with employers. Although this paper confirms the widespread view
that labour is rather weak in Eastern Europe, it indicates that unions can be proactive and shape their own
future if they have the capacity to mobilise their members and union leaders have the skills and willingness
to use both conflict and co-operation in their relationships with employers. The comparison of evidence
from Romania with other Eastern European countries reflects on the stage of Romanian transformation
and also illustrates a wider possible applicability of the theoretical framework employed for the study.
 
 
Zusammenfassung
 
Mit dem Wechsel von Zentralwirtschaft zu Marktwirtschaft mussten Gewerkschaften in osteuropäischen
Ländern entscheiden, wie sie sich in den industriellen Beziehungen positionieren. Dieses Working Paper
fragt, ob und warum Gewerkschaften sich strategisch für ein kooperationsorientiertes oder
konfliktorientiertes Verhalten gegenüber den Arbeitgebern entschieden haben. Gegenstand der
Untersuchung sind dabei die Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften auf nationaler,
sektoraler und Unternehmensebene in Rumänien. Konflikthafte und kooperative Beziehungen zwischen
Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften entwickelten sich nach 1989 parallel zueinander, mit einer höheren
Tendenz zur Kooperation. Die Studie zeigt, dass nicht nur ein ideologisches Erbe und überkommene
Institutionen, sondern auch die anfangs entschiedene Teilnahme an der makroökonomischen
Transformation für die Entscheidung der Gewerkschaften zur Kooperation mit den Arbeitgebern
ausschlaggebend waren. Die weit verbreitete Ansicht, dass Gewerkschaften in Osteuropa schwach sind,
wird bestätigt. Gleichzeitig wird jedoch gezeigt, dass sie es in der Hand haben, ihre eigene Zukunft offensiv
zu gestalten, vorausgesetzt, es gelingt ihnen, ihre Mitglieder zu mobilisieren. Darüber hinaus müssen
Gewerkschaftsführungen fähig und willig sein, sowohl Konflikt als auch Kooperation in ihren
Beziehungen zu den Arbeitgebern nutzen können. Der Vergleich der Ergebnisse aus Rumänien mit anderen
osteuropäischen Ländern spiegelt den Stand der Transformation in Rumänien wider und zeichnet ebenso
einen erweiterten Anwendungsbereich des der Studie zugrunde liegenden theoretischen Ansatzes.
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1   Introduction: radical change in 1989
 
The fall of the communist regime in Eastern Europe in 1989 conferred on unions the
freedom to enter into collective bargaining and social partnership with employers. In the
unitary communist system, with its centrally planned economy, trade unions were the largest
mass membership organisation, but their main functions were to support the realisation of
the economic plan decided by the communist apparatus and to distribute social benefits
(Thirkell/Vickerstaff 2002: 58). At the company level, there were no clear boundaries
between unions and the management. However, in contrast with business unionism in
western countries, the trade union leadership was integrated, and subordinated to the
Communist Party (Nelson 1986: 108). Therefore, collective bargaining and social
partnership between independent unions and (private) employers are new phenomena,
which emerged after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989.
 
This paper explores the strategic choices of trade unions in Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) during a period of radical change from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy model. It investigates whether (and why) unions have chosen adversarial
and/or co-operative relationships with the employers. It focuses on trade union relations
with employers at national, sectoral and company levels in Romania, while there is a limited
inference to other CEECs in order to highlight and contrast the developments in the
Romanian case. Despite a general climate that has favoured the market mechanism and
resulted in a massive decline of union membership as well as a decrease in living standards
for most employees (Ost 2000; Pollert 1999), evidence suggests that unions have often
chosen a partnership approach to industrial relations (Ost 2000; Vidinova 1997), except
when their survival has been at stake. As a result, various incipient forms of partnership
between unions and employers have emerged in the precarious transition context, but the
social partners are still in the process of learning how to deal with the new context.
 
The paper contributes to a relative new understanding of the strategic choices made by
industrial relations actors, and in particular trade unions, in maintaining and expanding their
roles during periods of economic transformation. Whilst most studies highlight the
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constraints faced by unions since 1989 (Crowley 2004; Ost 2000; Pollert 2000), this paper
argues that the transformation process has also provided unions with opportunities. It
emphasises the impact of the choices made by trade unions at different levels on industrial
relations practices at company level.[1] Nonetheless, the findings suggest that the strategic
choices of the unions were not the most important factor that shaped their role after 1989,
as evidence confirms the view of previous studies that institutional and ideological legacies
have represented major constraints. This study substantiates the widespread opinion that
labour is rather weak in Eastern Europe (Crowley 2004; Mailand/Due 2004; Crowley/Ost
2001; Pollert 1999), but it also illustrates that the transformation process has been shaped,
by the capability of unions to apply selected strategic choices. The theoretical framework
employed extends current conceptual paradigms for understanding the place and role of
trade unions in the complex transformation processes found in Eastern European countries.
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework on strategic
unionism. Section 3 explores the current situation across CEECs, by providing an overview
of the social partners and their relationships. Based on the primary data,[2] the main
practices of conflict and co-operation between unions and employers operating in Romania
at the national (transsectoral), sectoral and workplace levels are examined in Section 4.
These findings are analysed in a broader context in Section 5. This outlines similarities and
differences in the choices made by Romanian unions in comparison to unions in other
CEECs at the four levels identified in the theoretical framework. Section 5 and the
concluding part also explore possible implications for unions in Eastern Europe. The
Romanian experience illustrates an example of opportunities and constraints faced by
unions in Eastern Europe in the context of transformation from the centrally planned
economy to a market economy model.
 
 
2   Strategic unionism - the conceptual framework
 
A strategic choice perspective on industrial relations was first developed by
Kochan/McKersie/Cappelli (1984) in the US. Their main argument is that industrial
relations practices and outcomes are shaped not only by environmental forces, as Dunlop's
(1958) system framework indicates, but also by the strategic choices and values of
managers, trade union leaders, workers and public policy (Kochan/McKersie/Cappelli 1984:
20-21). The strategic choice model of Kochan/McKersie/Cappelli (1984) is criticised
primarily because it does not acknowledge the distribution of power among industrial
relations actors, which is a crucial aspect for imposing their choices on other parties (Kelly
1998: 19). Additionally, it does not provide a predictive model. Despite these shortcomings,
the strategic choice argument that the outcome of the industrial relations transformation is
not predetermined, since there are a variety of choices depending on parties' strategies and
environmental constraints, is widely accepted (Müller-Jentsch 2004: 27; Huzzard/Gregory
/Scott 2004).
 
Although the Kochan/McKersie/Cappelli (1984) study focused on the strategic choices of
employers, literature on the strategic choices of the unions started to develop from the
1990s. Recently, Huzzard (2004) developed a strategic model for trade unions. He argues
that despite the macro-level and micro-level constraints (e.g. economic context, employer
strategies, past choices of unions, technology, etc.) trade unions can have strategic choices
at four interrelated levels as follows:
 
- Level 1 concerns fundamental choices on mission, ideology and identity.
- Level 2 refers to key choices on the scope of activities (e.g. new services or membership
recruitment) and relationships.
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- Level 3 refers to key choices on ways of relating to employers (e.g. co-operation or
conflict), members, other unions and civil society.
- Level 4 concerns the choices on union structures, processes and capacities.
 
Huzzard (2004: 28) indicates that the higher levels shape the lower levels (e.g. level 1
shapes level 2), while the lower levels may also have an influence on the higher levels.
Although the strategic choice model for trade unions does not acknowledge how unions
acquire resources, it is a comprehensive conceptual framework that facilitates the
understanding of the connections between unions' choices at different levels. Additionally, a
focus on unions' strategic choices provides the opportunity to demonstrate that unions can
shape their own future, despite the fact that they are rarely in the driving seat (Huzzard
2004). The strategic choice approach to unions emphasises far more the constraints on
union choices than the original use of the concept by Kochan/McKersie/Cappelli (1984) did
to explain employers' behaviour during the 1980s in the US. This theoretical framework is
part of the body of recent literature on actor-centred institutional approach, which
recognises the crucial role of the existing institutional setting in facilitating or constraining
actors' choices, preferences and the evaluation of the outcomes (Müller-Jentsch 2004;
Scharpf 1997).
 
The demise of communism in Eastern Europe placed trade unions in a pluralistic societal
framework where strategic choices became an essential element of their role. Old and newly
established unions had to take key decisions regarding their mission and ideology, the scope
of their activities, the type of relations with the other actors and their internal structure. In
this study it is assumed that unions have enjoyed a degree of discretion in making these
decisions (Meardi 2004; Vikerstaff/Thirkell 2000; Vidinova 1997), while it is acknowledged
that their decisions have been constrained by both the external environment and their own
power resources, structures and values.
 
The paper utilises Huzzard's (2004) strategic choice model to identify key union choices in
the context of the radical change from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. It
focuses on level 3 choices of unions vis-à-vis employers (conflict and/or co-operation) in
Romania. In line with Huzzard (2004: 35), collective bargaining is seen primarily as an
adversarial relationship between capital and labour ('them and us'), based on the short-term
interests of parties that have a rather low degree of trust in each other (Crouch 1993). Social
partnership is considered a 'mutual gains' exchange based on long-term shared interests and
a high degree of trust, having a broader scope than collective bargaining (Kochan/Osterman
1994). As there are not generally agreed definitions, these terms are used from an
Anglo-Saxon perspective. However, it is recognised that in practice collective bargaining
and social partnership involve elements of both conflict and co-operation. Western
European countries have evolved a spectrum of collective bargaining and partnership
practices, and CEECs demonstrate wide-ranging differences in these areas.
 
 
3   The setting across CEECs - social partners and their relationships
 
3.1   Trade unions
 
During the communist period, trade union leaders were usually part of the party apparatus
and their main role was to ensure that members obeyed the party's rule and fulfilled the
plan, the so-called 'transmission belt' function (Hethy 1991). Additionally, unions
administrated in-company social benefits and dealt with individual issues arising at the
workplace. Unions generally did not truly negotiate collective agreements, as they were not
independent and did not have the right to strike. However, their independence from the
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Communist Party varied between being totally subordinated in Romania and being an
independent union movement (Solidarity) in Poland during the 1980s (Pravda/Ruble 1986).
Overall, the unions' freedom to negotiate with the party-state and the top managers was
very limited across CEECs during the communist regime.
 
Since 1989, unions in the CEECs have changed their role and structure, but there is also
continuity (Draus 2001; Deppe/Tatur 1997). Despite differences across CEECs, there are a
number of common trends in the development of trade unions after 1989. In all countries,
trade unions have emerged, either by restructuring former communist unions or by being set
up as new (rival) organisations to the former ones (Draus 2001: 11). Generally, the old
reformed unions have emerged as the dominant players, as they have retained most of the
assets of their predecessors, including a large number of members (Draus 2001: 11).
Initially, there was strong rivalry between the two types of unions, which has resulted in a
pluralist union structure at all levels, particularly in Hungary and Romania (see Table 1 for
confederations; Aro/Repo 1997). As Table 1 indicates, in countries that have adopted a
gradual approach to the economic restructuring, such as Slovakia and Romania, trade union
density is currently between 35% and 40%, while in the others it is even lower. The
economic restructuring, rising unemployment and the general climate-favouring market
mechanism resulted in a sharp decline in trade union membership during the 1990s.
 
 
Table 1 Organisational characteristics of the social partners in CEECs (latest available
data)
 
 Trade union
density in per
cent
Number of the most important
organisations
Employees in firms that
are members of an
employers' association in
per cent
Trade unions Employers'
associations
Bulgaria 25 4 2 N/A
Czech
Republic
30 1 2 35
Estonia 20 2 1 35
Hungary 25 6 4 N/A
Latvia 25 1 1 56
Lithuania 12-15 3 4 N/A
Poland 25 3 2 24
Romania 35 5 8 (2 since 2004) 65
Slovakia 30 3 1 65
Slovenia 40 1 2 100
 
Source: European Commission (2004); Funk/Lech (2004: 2); Preda (2004); Janssen/Galgoczi (2004).
 
 
Several studies indicate that trade unions have had a weak influence in the tripartite bodies
and on the transformation policy in all CEECs, although they continue to have a strong
political role (Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003; Crowley/Ost 2001; Draus 2001: 16; Pollert
1999). Their influence in the tripartite bodies also appears to depend on the degree of
macroeconomic transformation, as governments still need union support for reforms in
countries where the restructuring process is less advanced (Thirkell/Vickerstaff 2002).
Nevertheless, unions have had an important role in establishing the new labour legislation
throughout CEECs (Draus 2001). As unions have maintained their company-based
structure, several unions may be present in an enterprise (Pollert 1999; Aro/Repo 1997).
Company unions are not always independent of the management (Stanojevic/Gradev 2003:
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45), resulting in a weak effectiveness of company collective bargaining (Aro/Repo 1997).
After testing several hypotheses, Crowley (2004) indicates that institutional and ideological
legacies of the communist period best explain the overall weakness of labour in Eastern
Europe.
 
 
3.2   Employers' associations
 
In a centrally planned economy there are no employers' associations per se. During the
communist period, the state-owned enterprises were associated in chambers of commerce
and industry for commercial purposes, but they did not deal with employment issues and
they were subordinated to the party-state (Hethy 1991). Hence, employers' associations are
a new institution developed in CEECs after 1989.
 
Although there are major differences between employers' associations, evidence indicates a
weak institutional development across CEECs. Draus (2001: 5) argues that employers'
associations in CEECs are artificial players created with substantial assistance from the
state to put in place tripartite structures in order to meet immediate political interests. Other
studies also reveal that employers' associations are primarily interest groups (representing
initially state enterprises) dealing with economic policy and providing services for individual
members (e.g. legal assistance), but they are frequently not authorised by their members to
conclude collective agreements on their behalf (Mihes/Casale 1999; Toth 1997: 340;
Lecher/Optenhogel 1995). Moreover, there is often rivalry between employers'
organisations, which has led to a fragmented structure (Table 1). The weak development of
employers' associations is usually explained in terms of heterogeneity of the new (private)
employers, lack of experience, and individual employers' strength at company level (Draus
2001; Martin 1999; Toth 1997; Lecher and Optenhogel 1995). In the unstable and
sometimes ambiguous transition context, private employers frequently prefer to act through
individual political contacts and single-employer bargaining at company level (Draus 2001:
8; Martin 1999; Aro/Repo 1997). Therefore, empirical studies throughout CEECs reveal
that employers' organisations are generally not well developed.
 
 
3.3   Conflict and/or co-operation?
 
Since the beginning of the transition period, tripartism[3] has been the strategic choice of
the social partners throughout CEECs for pragmatic reasons (Thirkell/Vickerstaff 2002;
Hethy 2001). First, tripartism is a source of mutual legitimisation for the parties involved,
which have been facing deficits of support (Hethy 2001: 10). Secondly, tripartism is a
means of securing legitimacy for political and economic transformation and of maintaining
social peace in a context of economic recession (Hethy 2001: 10; Martin 1999: 379).
Thirdly, there is a long tradition in CEECs of governments dealing with trade unions at
national level and relying on unions to implement their policies (Vidinova 1997: 86). Finally,
international organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation and the EU, also
recommend tripartism (Hethy 2001: 11). For unions, the short-term choice to share the
burden of the transformation is outweighed by the privilege of being a reform maker and
ensuring restructuring without major losses in employees' rights over the long term
(Vidinova 1997). Nevertheless, across Eastern Europe, tripartism is primarily an action
initiated by the state seeking the support of trade unions for its reform.
 
Tripartite forums have been designed to deal with shared interests as well as adversarial
issues. According to Hethy (2001: 14), the main functions of the tripartite bodies in the
region have been as follows:
MPIfG Working Paper 05/7, A. Trif, K. Koch: Strategic Unionism in Eas... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp05-7/wp05-7.html
6 von 21 19.07.2011 13:12
 (a)  consultation over the establishment of new labour institutions and the legislative
framework;
(b)  national-level wage negotiation;
(c)  participation in public policy formulation with regard to income, wage, employment and
social policies;
(d)  settlement of national industrial conflicts.
 
Of these, only (a) has dealt primarily with shared interests, as all three partners have been
committed (at least initially) to establishing a legal framework that facilitates the
development of social dialogue and voluntary collective bargaining (Lado 2002), while (b),
(c) and (d) have been predominantly adversarial issues. As Table 2 shows, collective
bargaining and social partnership have been operating simultaneously across CEECs. Thus,
the creation of tripartite bodies has been based on a long-term commitment between the
parties, but it has been accepted that arenas for co-operation and adversarial activities
would be set up.
 
During the communist period, collective bargaining (if it existed) was not an essential
mechanism for defining the terms and conditions of employment because it was generally
the state which determined wages directly, by setting for instance wage scales and wage
funds for enterprises, or indirectly, by drafting regulations based on the central plan (Hethy
1991: 135). Moreover, there were neither independent unions nor autonomous employers.
In countries such as Hungary and Poland (where there was a degree of decentralisation)
limited collective bargaining at company level had taken place (Hethy 1991:130-131;
Pravda/Ruble 1986), but in Romania there was no tradition of voluntary collective
bargaining. By and large, there was no real collective bargaining during the communist
period in CEECs.
 
 
Table 2   Collective bargaining and social pacts in CEECs (latest available data)
 
 Wage bargaining
levels
% of employees
covered by
collective
agreement
The most recent tripartite social
pacts/developments
(year)
Bulgaria Sector**
Company* 
25-30 2002
Czech Republic Company***
Sector*
25-30 1994
Estonia Company***
Sector*
20-30 2003
Hungary Company***
Sector*
+/- 40 2004
(wage deal that recommends 6% wage
increase in 2005)
Latvia Company***
Sector*
Intersectoral*
<20 2004
Lithuania Company***
Sector*
+/- 10 Negotiations in 2004 failed due to the lack
of agreement on minimum wage increase.
Poland Company***
Sector*
+/- 40 Negotiations in 2003 failed due to
mistrust between negotiating parties.
No agreement on minimum wage
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increase in 2005.
Romania Company***
Sector*
N/A 2004
Slovakia Sector***
Company*
+/- 40 2000
No agreement reached in 2003-2004.
Trade unions did not agree with policies on
cuts in welfare provision, reform of the
pension system and minimum wage.
Slovenia Intersectoral***
Sectoral*
Company*
<100 2003
(for 2003-2005)
 
Source:  Toth/Neumann (2004); Schulten (2005)
Legend: *** = dominant level; ** = important level, * = of relatively minor importance.
 
 
As Table 2 shows, collective bargaining is generally decentralised and its coverage is far
lower in CEECs than in Western Europe (Schulten 2005). The coverage of collective
agreements varies in CEECs: from below 20% in Latvia and Lithuania to almost 100% in
Slovenia. There are no data available for Romania, but it is likely to be closer to Slovakia
since union density is similar and, in companies where there are unions, a collective
agreement is usually concluded. The low coverage in CEECs is associated with the
decentralised structure of collective bargaining. The weak development of sectoral
collective bargaining is generally explained in terms of inherited institutional legacies (e.g.
strong legal intervention, trade unions based within companies and a lack of autonomy of
the social actors) and employers' preference for single-employer bargaining (Lado 2002: 6;
Draus 2001: 24-25; Toth 1997). Therefore, in the unstable economic and structural
environment characterised for many years by economic recession, the growth of the
informal sector, and a rise in unemployment, collective bargaining is not well consolidated.
 
 
4   Conflict and co-operation in practice in Romania
 
With the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, unions achieved the freedom to
negotiate with employers. Evidence suggests that collective bargaining and social
partnership are taking place at three main levels. A preliminary synopsis of current and
prospective co-operation and conflict at various levels is presented in Table 3. Unlike in the
EU member states, the unions in Romania have virtually no relations with employers at
international level. This is likely to change if Romania joins the EU in 2007. Trade unions'
strategic choices after 1989 and the prospects of co-operation and/or conflict at the
national, sectoral and company levels are examined in detail in the next section, based
primarily on interview data.
 
 
Table 3   Conflict and co-operation in practice in Romania
 
Level Collective bargaining/CB
(predominant conflict)
Partnership approach
(predominant co-operation)
Prospects
Global/
International
No No Participation via European
Works Councils
(co-operation)
National First stage of CB
(transsectoral agreement):
bargaining role of (the five
representative) union
Historical legacy of
authoritarian corporatism.
Incipient co-operation in the
tripartite Economic and
Less scope for co-operation
once labour legislation
beomes more stable.
Increased pressure for
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confederations, though this
results in a minimal
framework for lower levels
of negotiation.
Social Council (e.g.
co-determination on labour
legislation, consultation on
social policy and EU
enlargement).
decentralisation at the
company and sector levels.
 
Sectoral Second stage of CB 
(industry agreement):
bargaining role of union
federations, but still a
minimal framework for the
company agreement (e.g. in
the chemical sector).
Incipient forms of
co-operation in the sectoral
tripartite commissions (e.g.
information and consultation
on sectoral issues, such as
bad weather funds in the
construction industry).
Potential increased
co-operation with the
sectoral tripartite bodies
consolidated.
Local/
Workplace
Third stage of CB  (company
agreement): the last stage of
CB at which the actual terms
and conditions of
employment, including
wages, are established. Most
large companies have a
collective agreement.
Company agreements
(e.g. Petromidia).
Co-determination where
there are shared interests
(e.g. privatisation, subsidies
from the state in the public
sector, training and health
and safety).
Union representation on
consultative bodies,
including company boards.
Both conflict and
co-operation.
Evidence of union
preference for co-operation,
but also indication and
tradition of unions being
co-opted by the management.
 
 
 
4.1   Strong state involvement at the national level
 
In Romania, the first tripartite institution was created in 1993 as part of a Phare assistance
programme (Mihes/Casale 1999: 277). The Tripartite Secretariat for Social Dialogue was
established to provide support in setting up labour institutions and a legal framework that
would facilitate the dialogue between unions, employers' associations and the government.
This institution was dissolved in 1997, when the direct funding from Phare ceased.
Nevertheless, a new Economic and Social Council was created by the government in 1997
(Law no. 141/1997). This Council had an advisory role in developing economic and social
policy. It endorsed draft legislation mainly on wages, employees' rights and duties,
unemployment, social insurance and pensions. A new law (Law no 58/2003) extended its
role (enabling it, for instance, to make proposals for monetary, financial and income
policies) and made it more inclusive, by allowing representatives of professional and
non-governmental organisations to be part of it. Despite fairly extensive legal rights, its
General Secretary revealed that its effectiveness in representing employees' interests was
reduced. He indicated that employers' associations were still very weak and dominated by
the state representatives. As a result, the state could often pursue its initial proposals,
assuming a double role, as both government and employer in the tripartite forum.
 
The commitment to partnership has been reinforced in recent years. A tripartite National
Agency for Employment and Professional Training was set up in 1999. Its main scope is to
deliver training services for job seekers, to assist with job recruitment and to manage the
unemployment fund (Mihes/Casale 1999: 281). Additionally, the first social pact (Acord
Social) was signed in 2001 between trade unions, employers' associations and the newly
elected government. Trade unions agreed to refrain from industrial action for one year in
exchange for the government's commitment to take action to increase the living standards of
the population and to create new jobs (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2002: 529). As the
government was unable to fulfil these promises, the second largest union confederation, the
Cartel Alfa, withdrew from the agreement after six months. The social pact also included
provisions to establish a tripartite forum for every industrial sector, which should meet
whenever a party required a debate on issues specific to that particular sector. The social
MPIfG Working Paper 05/7, A. Trif, K. Koch: Strategic Unionism in Eas... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp05-7/wp05-7.html
9 von 21 19.07.2011 13:12
pact was renewed in 2002, but only three out of the five largest union confederations signed
it (Rusu 2002: 29). Negotiations over a 2003 social agreement ended in failure. A tripartite
'social stability pact' for 2004 was concluded, but it was signed only by two trade union
confederations. The other three unions rejected the social pact because they were
dissatisfied with the level of minimum wage. Also, they considered that this social pact was
just a way for the government to make political capital in an election year. Thus, a
partnership approach has been developing on the national arena, but the social partners are
just learning to co-operate with each other.
 
Romanian trade unions have also used the national arena for adversarial activities. As
indicated in Table 3, the first step of collective bargaining process takes place at the national
level.[4] The most recent national collective agreement was concluded in December 2004,
and it is valid for 2005-7006 (Preda 2005a). Despite the fact that the agreement establishes
only a minimal framework for lower levels of collective bargaining, the national
negotiations have sometimes led to industrial action. At the beginning of the 1990s, strikes
were quite frequent and mainly related to wages and job security (Kideckel 2001: 103).
Apart from 'bread and butter' issues, Romanian trade unions, particularly mining
organisations, have also been involved in political strikes. Although strikes have generally
started with demands for wage increases, the miners strike and march on Bucharest in
September 1991, for example, led directly to the fall of the first democratically elected
government (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 1999: 399). Additionally, under union pressure, the
government has favoured particular industries. For instance, the Government Ordinance
22/1997 entitled miners that had worked for more than 15 years to receive a severance
payment worth 20 monthly wages, while workers in the other sectors were entitled to less
than 12 months wages (Kideckel 2001: 107). Nevertheless, wage increases achieved by
unions have regularly been followed by a higher increase in inflation (Rusu 2002;
Pert/Vasile 1995). Therefore, industrial actions have resulted in some successes, but these
have generally been short-lived solutions.
 
The new government elected in Romania in 2004 intends to change the Labour Code of
2003, to allow more flexibility for employers and less rights for employees. Trade unions are
fighting against these changes, but the issue is not settled yet (in June 2005). In spite of the
major constrains during the shift from centrally planned economies to market-based
economies, the developments in Romania show that the transformation process has
provided unions with some opportunities allowing them to influence the creation of labour
institutions.
 
Nonetheless, the unions' achievements have not resulted in a positive outcome for labour
where it counts the most. Overall, unions have failed to preserve or increase labour's
purchasing power and employees' jobs (Kideckel 2001: 97). Additionally, the disrespect of
employers and the government for the labour laws and the expansion of black market
labour made the success of the unions very limited at operational level (interviewees; see
also Clarke/Cremers/Janssen 2003). Romanian unions have been among the most militant in
Eastern Europe (Crowley 2004: 404; Martin 1999), but they have become more committed
to partnership than to adversarial relations as the developments at the sectoral and the
company levels indicate.
 
 
4.2   (Under)Developments at the sectoral level
 
Formal arenas for co-operation and conflict have been established at the sectoral level, but
there is a weak development of the relationship between the social partners. The legislation
provides for the establishment of Consultative Commissions of Social Dialogue at ministries
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and at the prefects' offices. These are tripartite consultative bodies consisting of
representatives of the concerned ministry (or local authority), trade union federations and
employers' associations from a particular industry (or area). In these forums, social partners
are consulted on draft laws concerning the specific industry and enterprise restructuring
measures, and they can bring up any claims and proposals to be considered (Mihes/Casale
1999: 281). Additionally, other incipient forms of tripartite bodies have emerged, such as
the Social House of Builders in the construction industry. Its main functions are to manage
the bad weather funds and to deal with training issues in the construction industry.
Therefore, arenas for co-operation at the sectoral level have been established in Romania
which, institutionally, are more solid than in other CEECs (Clarke/Cremers/Janssen 2003).
 
However, evidence indicates a low effectiveness of the tripartite forums in practice,
primarily due to a very weak commitment on the part of employers. For instance, in the
case of the chemical industry, where a sectoral employers' association named the Fepachim
has been operating since the 1990s, an official revealed that it is very difficult to achieve a
common position of members. A further illustration of the slight importance attached by
members to the employers' association is the fact that the staff of the Fepachim consisted of
four officials, only one of whom (the vice-president) was working full time for the
organisation. Additionally, the association's headquarters consist of a room in the same
state-owned enterprise as that of the largest union federation. The Fepachim illustrates a
fairly typical case of the degree of (under)development of employers' associations in
Romania. The slow development of the private sector has made the Romanian employers'
associations among the weakest in Eastern Europe. Thus, it has been very difficult for
unions to develop collective bargaining and/or social partnership at the sectoral level if they
have a very weak partner on the employers' side.
 
The sectoral level represents the second stage of collective bargaining (Table 3). Unlike
Western Europe, the sectoral collective bargaining in Romania only provides a minimal
framework for the particular sector. It deals with a wide range of issues, from wages to
training and health and safety standards. The provisions of the sectoral agreements cannot
be set below those established by the national collective agreement and the Labour Code.
As in other CEECs, the main reasons for collective disputes at the sectoral level have been
pay levels, delays in the payment of wages in the public sector and the restructuring of basic
industries such as mining, railways and steel (trade union officials interviewed; see also
Martin/Cristescu-Martin 1999: 396).
 
Although Romanian unions have generally been able to mobilise their members in the public
sectors, the number of strikes has declined. The trade union officials interviewed revealed
that during the 1990s they learned that dialogue with employers' representatives on
long-term interests usually resulted in a better outcome for their members than adversarial
relations focused on pay increases. Respondents revealed that the increase of wages as a
result of a strike at sectoral level was generally followed by an even higher rise in inflation.
Furthermore, the prolonged economic recession and the reduction of the public sector due
to privatisation, alongside increasing unemployment and a huge decline in trade union
membership, resulted in unfavourable conditions for unions. Thus, social partnership and
collective bargaining at the sectoral level are still fragile in Romania, as they are in most
CEECs (Kohl/Platzer 2003; Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). The unions' strategic choice
of a decentralised internal structure has not supported the development of sectoral and
regional institutions in Eastern Europe, as will be shown in the next section.
 
 
4.3   Limited strategic choices for unions at the company level
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As in other Eastern European countries, the strategic choice of trade unions in Romania has
been to preserve their company-based membership and the institutional monopoly that
existed before 1989. Trade unions and employers have been generally against the
introduction of a dual channel of representation (Kohl/Platzer 2003). However, the EU
regulations on minimum information and consultation rights made the introduction of works
council structures necessary in the candidate countries. The solutions adopted by different
countries varied. In Romania, similar to the Czech Republic, a single channel of
representation remained in place, but since 2003 employees in companies with at least 20
employees who have no union representation have had the right to elect representatives for
up to two years. The elected representatives have similar legal rights of information,
consultation and collective bargaining as trade unions. Therefore, in countries such as
Romania, trade unions and employees' representatives in non-unionised workplaces have
formal rights for dealing with shared and conflicting interests at the company level.
 
The reform process has created opportunities for the trade unions, but also a large number
of constraints. The main opportunities for unions at the company level indicated by our
interviewees are as follows:
 
- The restructuring and privatisation processes have given unions the chance to participate
in the decision-making process (e.g. Petromidia case study).
- The massive reduction of personnel has represented an incentive for employees in large
companies to join unions in order to protect them from unfair dismissal and to obtain a
reasonable severance package if they are made redundant.[5]
- In the context of low living standards, employees from very large companies have
revealed that they joined unions to obtain financial help (e.g. loans with a low interest
rate, reimbursement of expenses in the case of medical problems etc.).
 
These opportunities have been grasped particularly by autonomous trade unions operating
in large companies.
 
However, there have been a large number of constraints that have affected company unions
according to the respondents, such as:
 
- The rationalisation process, which has resulted in a massive reduction of personnel, many
of whom have been trade union members.
- The fact that many companies were previously making losses, which has resulted in a
prolonged economic recession and no benefits to share between employer and
employees.[6]
- The emergence of new small and medium-sized companies, where employers generally
have not accepted unions.
- Additionally, the strategic choice of the unions to operate within the companies has often
resulted in the co-optation of unions by the management.
 
These opportunities and constrains have affected unions to different degrees throughout
Eastern Europe (Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003; Stanojevic/Gradev, 2003). Since the
marketisation process in Romania is less advanced than in countries such as Poland and
Hungary, trade union density is still higher than the Eastern European average
(Stanojevic/Gradev, 2003: 38). However, the restructuring and privatisation of the
loss-making companies that are still subsidised by the state is likely to lead to further decline
in trade union membership in the near future.
 
Research reveals that the prevalence of conflict and co-operation varies across companies.
Our interviews and other evidence indicates that, after 2000, industrial conflict prevailed at
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the company level only when employees' jobs were at stake or when employees did not
receive their agreed wages or other benefits (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2002). Nevertheless,
in May 2005, an industrial dispute erupted at Coca Cola Romania after collective bargaining
negotiations on pay increases failed. The main claim of employees was a 20% pay rise,
while the management was not willing to provide more than a 10% increase, which was less
than the annual inflation (Preda 2005b). Initially, eight company union activists went on
four days hunger strike. They aimed to pressure the management while trying to minimise
the negative impact on the operation of the company. As no agreement has been reached to
date (June 2005), it appears likely that employees will go on strike. Since trade unions
membership is company-based, unions are in a very delicate position. It is vital for them to
prevent the closure of their company as their survival is at risk. In the case of the mining
sector and several large companies, Romanian unions have won few clashes over
government decisions to close down loss-making companies (Kideckel 2001) as the
Petromidia case study demonstrates.
 
Petromia illustrates the dynamics of conflict and co-operation in a large company with a
strong new union (over 90 % union density) set up by a group of blue-collar workers in
1990. The relationship between the newly established trade union and the management
team began with an adversarial relationship in 1990. The elected trade union leaders
required employees to endorse managers through secret ballot (interviewees). Employees
validated all the management team, apart from the general manager, who left the company
following the 'low trust' vote. Subsequently, there was co-operation between the
management team and the company trade union, and decisions regarding the labour force
were taken jointly (interviewees). A union official revealed that union representatives have
since had a consultative role and are invited to all meetings of the management board
regarding production. They are also consulted over redundancies, training and investment
(interviewees). The partnership approach between the union and management was
confirmed in 1997, when the government decided that Petromidia should be closed down as
a result of making huge losses. Trade union officials initiated a meeting with the Prime
Minister Ciorbea, where, together with the Chief Executive, they convinced the government
that it was state intervention in the price of fuel and the exchange rate (which was kept very
low) that made the company non-profitable (respondent participant in the meeting).
 
Additionally, the union was involved in the privatisation process. The union negotiated with
the buyer the level of investment and secured the jobs of the 3577 employees for five years.
According to a senior manager, 'at Petromidia there was a trade union which had a company
attached, not a company with a trade union. In the privatisation contract, union
representatives achieved a clause to keep the number of jobs for five years and to retain
certain managerial prerogatives, such as to be part of a mixed commission which takes any
employment decision. The contract also stipulated that the trade union should be allowed to
participate in individual bargaining and to be informed about individual wages, which are
supposed to be confidential.' The case of Petromidia indicates that unions can be proactive
and shape their own future if they have the capacity to mobilise their members and if union
leaders have the skills and willingness to use both conflict and co-operation in their
relationships with employers. This case demostrates that unions can even be in the driving
seat, but this is atypical of Romania.
 
The Petromidia case study also shows a more common tendency of maintaining a coalition
between company trade unions and the management when the survival of the company is at
risk, as here both parties were interested in keeping the company operating for their own
survival. In the public sector, unions and the management still have a shared interest to
obtain as many resources from the state as possible (e.g. subsidies, exemption for paying
certain taxes, etc.). However, findings indicate that genuine partnership is possible only in
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companies where the employer has financial resources and displays a willingness to enter
into a partnership arrangement. Although partnership based on mutual gains for unions and
employers appears to be rarely found in Romania, certain multinational companies (e.g.
Xerox) and Petromidia have successfully adopted it (interviewees). Summing up, findings
suggest that collective bargaining and social partnership have developed together although,
in many companies, trade unions have rather limited choices. Evidence indicates that a
partnership approach is possible even in the precarious transition context of Romania, but it
requires strong partners that have the ability to deal with both conflict and co-operation.
 
 
5   Implications for trade unions in CEECs
 
Since the 1980s unions around the world have had to adapt to a fairly hostile environment,
in which the freedom of market forces rather than social values has been promoted. Whilst
in developed countries unions have had to adjust and redefine their scope and strategies, in
Eastern Europe independent unions have had to be established in this context. Despite an
initial high trade union density in 2002, the weighed average in the eight Eastern European
countries that joined the EU in 2004 was 21.1%, compared to the 30.4% weighted EU
average (Stanojevic/Gradev 2003: 38). In Romania, trade union density is around 35%, but
unions are not necessarily independent of management (interviewees),[7] which is a
precondition for unions exercising strategic choices. Using the model developed by Huzzard
(2004), this paper will now examine the prospects and implications of unions' strategic
decisions taken during the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based
economy.
 
Huzzard (2004) argues that unions generally have strategic choices on four different levels.
The first level, also termed first-order choices, refers to key decisions on union missions,
ideology and basic identity. In Eastern Europe, the first-order choices of unions were
primarily affected by the labour relations existing in 1989, economic context and the social
expectation of union members (Clarke/Cremers/Janssen 2003; Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead
2003; Stanojevic/Gradev 2003; Rusu 2002). As trade unions were the largest mass
organisation and since, in countries such as Poland, unions (e.g. Solidarity) were the
initiators of the politico-economic change, they were expected to support the change
towards a more efficient economic system that would (hopefully) improve workers'
conditions in the long term. In countries such as Romania, where unions were not involved
in political change, they could be easily labelled as relics of the communist regime (Martin
1999; Pollert 1999). In this context, unions acted by and large as social movements and
they supported the transformation process (prevalent partnership approach), although
restructuring led to massive decline in trade union membership.
 
In all CEECs, unions were initially involved in the political and economic transformation,
albeit to various degrees, with the extreme case of Solidarity that led a coalition government
in Poland (Thirkell/Vickerstaff 2002). Scholars found puzzling that the first Solidarity-led
government introduced a very liberal programme of economic shock therapy in Poland,
instead of a worker-friendly capitalism (Ost/Weinstein 1999). Evidence appears to confirm
Lipset's (1983) hypothesis that the more trade unions participate in the political and
economic transformation, the less radical their initial and subsequent ideologies are.
However, the fact that communist (radical) unions had little legitimacy after the demise of
the communist regimes made it almost impossible for unions to choose a radical ideology. It
would be interesting to test the validity of Lipset's (1983) hypothesis against further
comparative research across Eastern Europe.
 
The first-order strategic choices shape the second-order choices over the scope of union
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activities and which relationships unions should enter into (Huzzard 2004). The choice to
support the transformation process in CEECs gave them the opportunity to be involved in
shaping the emerging industrial relations system, to participate in social policy formulation
and, sometimes even, to help shape the economic policies themselves (Clarke/Cremers
/Janssen 2003; Kohl/Platzer 2003; Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). Additionally, the
process of accession to the EU, particularly the requirements regarding the transposition of
the social chapter into the national legal framework, represented an opportunity for unions
to be involved in policy formulation (Kohl/Platzer 2003; Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003;
Rusu 2002). Although the unions' role has diminished with the progress in economic
restructuring and the finalisation of the social chapter transposition into national legislation
(Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003), there are new opportunities for union participation, such
as in the development of the Economic and Monetary Union (Meardi 2004).
 
Currently, Romanian unions are stronger and more involved in the tripartite bodies at the
national level than unions in countries where reforms are more advanced, such as Hungary
and Poland. Evidence suggests that Romanian unions have used the mobilisation more than
unions in other CEECs to achieve a relatively supportive legislative basis for the defence of
union recognition and collective bargaining (Clarke/Cremers/Janssen 2003; Kideckel 2001;
Martin 1999). Nevertheless, as in other CEECs, most union activities are related to the
transition process. Thus, Romanian unions would have to redefine and anticipate the needs
of their members in order to (at least) preserve their influence in the decision-making
process. Also, an obvious choice would be to attempt to recruit members in the growing
number of small and medium-sized companies, where there is usually no union
representation. However, unions' second-order choices are constrained by the third and
fourth-order choices.
 
The third-order strategic choices refer to key choices on ways of relating to employers,
members, other unions and civil society (Huzzard 2004). Evidence suggests that since 1989
Romanian trade unions, similar to those from the other CEECs, have faced problems of
survival and legitimisation, and they have focused more on the political field than on
workplace representation (Martin 1999; Pollert 1999). Unions have participated in the
national public policy formulation via tripartite bodies or individual positions in the
government (Rusu 2002). Their political participation has only partially solved the problem
of survival and it has not solved the problems of internal legitimisation. Therefore, unions
have had some influence in shaping the new labour legislation, but the economic recession,
the massive reduction in personnel and the unions' inherited legacies have resulted in a
decentralised and fragmented union movement, with weak influence at the company level.
 
Throughout Eastern Europe, unions generally have not managed to preserve labour's
purchasing power and employees' jobs (Galgoczi/Mermet 2003). Despite a long-term
commitment to partnership, real wages have lagged substantially behind labour productivity
in most countries (Galgoczi/Mermet 2003: 50). Nevertheless, the Petromidia case study
indicates that genuine partnership with a positive outcome for both labour and capital may
be achieved even in the uncertain transition context. Therefore, evidence suggests that
elements of both collective bargaining and social partnership have developed in tandem
during the transition period in Eastern Europe, but their effectiveness for labour, in terms of
maintaining at least the quality of working life, has usually been reduced (Clarke/Cremers
/Janssen 2003; Kohl/Platzer 2003; Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). This is primarily a
result of a weak development of the social partners along with a politico-economic context
that has favoured the neo-liberal policies.
 
The case of Romania indicates that fourth-order strategic choices, which relate to unions'
internal structure (Huzzard 2004), have also affected the second and third-order choices of
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unions. A precondition for unions to have strategic choices is to be established as
autonomous organisations from the management. The choice of unions to have a
company-based membership has resulted in them not having any representation in the
newly established companies and enjoying only debatable independence from the company
management in many companies (interviews; Stanojevic/Gradev 2003). Furthermore, there
is rivalry between the old reformed unions and the newly established organisations (Pollert
1999). Nevertheless, an attempt by union federations to establish an individual membership
base may result in a sharp decline in union membership, since there is no such tradition in
Eastern Europe. Also, trade union officials from the construction and chemical federations
in Romania have revealed that company unions oppose the establishment of such structures.
The weak establishment of the intermediary structures is common across Eastern Europe,
not least because the company unions have had the power to choose to remain the most
important layer in the union hierarchies (Clarke/Cremers/Janssen 2003; Kohl/Platzer 2003;
Lado/Vaughan-Whitehead 2003).
 
In order to become a social partner that has strategic choices in its relations with employers,
unions need to be well established (in terms of representation, internal coherence and
legitimacy) in independent organisations at all levels. The Petromidia case study revealed
that both the partnership approach and collective bargaining require strong and autonomous
partners. Research findings suggest that trade unions in Eastern Europe are still learning
how to achieve resources that will allow them to choose between co-operation and conflict
with the employers. Although this paper emphasises the common opportunities and
constraints faced by unions in Eastern Europe based on the Romanian case study, it is
acknowledged that there is great variation in the industrial relations systems across and
within CEECs (Kohl/Platzer 2003; Trif 2004). The comparison of empirical evidence from
Romania with other Eastern European countries reflects on the stage of Romanian
transformation and also points to a possible wider applicability of the theoretical framework
employed for the study.
 
 
6   Conclusions
 
The shift from centrally planned economies to market economic models has presented trade
unions in CEECs with crucial strategic choices in relation to their roles as industrial
relations actors. This paper has focused on the strategic choices of trade unions in Romania
during such a period of intense economic transformation; in particular it has assessed the
trade union propensities for relationships of either conflict or co-operation with employers.
Adversarial and partnership scenarios between trade unions and employers take place at
national, sectoral and workplace levels. In the national arena the social partners are mostly
'out of step', though some co-operation takes place through institutional arrangements such
as the social pact. Union gains have been modest, as the central issues of pay and
employment have been dominated by the state and government failure to uphold labour
codes. Social partnership at the national level has been characterised by a distinct lack of a
stable co-operative model.
 
At sectoral level, the establishment of a negotiation arena has given the social partners the
opportunity to practise the intricacies of conflict and co-operation. As has been argued,
formal frameworks such as the Consultative Commissions of Social Dialogue have provided
a forum where trade union federations, employers' associations and government
representation can engage in dialogue on a range of pertinent issues. Although Romania has
more advanced arrangements in this respect than other CEECs, research has revealed that
the tripartite forums have a low effectiveness. A central problem is the weakness of the
employers' associations in Romania; trade unions are faced with a social partner incapable
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of deciding on what kind of relationships they wish to engage in. Collective bargaining at
sectoral level provides an opportunity for the trade unions to bargain collectively, but
conflicts, particularly in the public sector, have decreased due to the poor economic
performance of Romania and the decline of union membership. Research findings show that
strategic choice at this level, by the central actors in the trade unions, has been changing
from overt strikes towards co-operation with employers.
 
However, the major strategic choice by the trade unions in Romania and the CEECs has
been to retain their company-based membership to support their traditional institutional
monopoly. The configuration of collective bargaining and partnership at company level is
complex and varied because of reform measures which, on the one hand, have allowed
participation in decision-making processes by the unions (the Petromidia case study
illustrating this during the restructuring and privatisation programme of the company). On
the other hand, rationalisation processes leading to redundancies are clearly adversarial
issues. Formal participation rights enshrined in Labour Codes are on present evidence no
guarantee that effective partnership rules will evolve. The general conclusion is that trade
unions have limited strategic choices at company level, but there is a spectrum of choices
determined partly by the stage of transformation of individual Eastern European countries
and partly by the structure and nature of companies. Petromidia, for example, had
developed autonomous trade unions that were able to genuinely choose between conflict
and co-operation with the employer. However, the case study company was atypical of
Romanian experience and the social partners mostly enjoyed a workplace partnership
because their common aim was to sustain the economic viability of the company during the
difficult transition period.
 
Social partnership in the western pluralist and democratic sense is a new phenomenon in
Eastern Europe; it is easily masked by the pre-1989 contours of communist co-operation.
The trade unions' initial strategic choice was to support the transformation of the centrally
planned economy into a market-based economy, but the unions were confronted, and still
are, with the vestiges of the communist legacies. Their involvement in tripartite bodies at
national level is a determined attempt to influence and create an acceptable social
partnership. The unions have had a measure of success in shaping the post-1989 labour
legislation, but the legitimisation of the unions remains a significant issue. The evidence
from Romania is that unions are still in the process of acquiring legitimacy, of having to
resolve internal tensions, of becoming autonomous representative organisations and of
convincing employers of the value of the social partnership model. Despite major structural
and institutional constraints, this paper illustrates that the transformation process has been
continually shaped by the capability of unions to apply selected strategic choices. The
overall picture in Eastern Europe suggests that the actors in the industrial relations system
are still learning how to achieve a social partnership model with mutual gains for labour and
capital.
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Endnotes
 
1
There are several studies that examine the role of trade unions in social dialogue, but they
focus on the national level (Iankova/Turner 2004; Meardi 2004).
 
2
The study is based on 107 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2000-2001 in Romania
with trade union officials (six respondents), employers' association officials (five
respondents) and state representatives (five respondents), plus company union officials,
shop stewards, human resource managers and employees (91 respondents) from 20
companies from different industrial sectors. Among the companies investigated, there is a
case study approach to industrial relations in a recently privatised (large) petrochemical
company (Petromidia), which has developed a workplace partnership.
 
3
This refers to dialogue and consultation between representatives of government, trade union
confederations and employers' associations, principally relating to labour issues (Casale
1997).
 
4
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 The legislation requires that provisions of the national agreement should apply to all
companies.
 
5
A survey in four large companies indicates that 8.1 % of their labour force were not union
members before 1989 whereas by 2001 the figure had fallen to 4.5% (Trif 2004: 210).
 
6
These companies survive by being subsidised by the state. However, if the state tries to
withdraw these subsidies, there is usually a coalition between management and trade unions
to preserve the subsidies (e.g. Petromidia).
 
7
National trade union officials indicated that more than half of union activists at the
company level are not independent from the management (see details in Trif 2004: 217-
219).
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